Thursday, December 11, 2008

It is, and always has been, a two theater war

With all the of the attention being focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan these days its easy to forget that the bulk of the 200,000 or so U.S. troops actively engaged in the 'War on Terror' remain in Iraq. And although the attention to the 'forgotten war' on Afghanistan is welcome after nearly 6 years of malign neglect, we must not forget that this is, always has been and will continue to be a two 'theater' war against international terrorists and the states and interests that support them. As the new Administration prepares to take office they must recognize that one of the fatal errors made during the Bush presidency was to conceptualize these theaters as being completely distinct conflicts and focus excessively on one to the detriment of the other. The two "theaters" that I am referring to are of course the South Asia theater and the "Arab" or Middle Eastern theater. The new Administration needs to be prepared to focus and fight on both fronts simultaneously.

Instability in Pakistan, the worsening situation in Afghanistan and the Mumbai attacks have all recently drawn attention back to the South Asian theater. Additionally, Obama's hawkish campaign statements about Afghanistan and Pakistan and his remarks about the need to develop a "regional approach" in South Asia have all shifted the discourse towards this neglected theater of Bush's war. Finally improvements in Iraq and Lebanon and a reduction in tensions with Iran have also contributed to the shift in focus to the East.

Yet it would be a major mistake to turn our attention too far away from the situation in Iraq. Obama's domestic spending priorities and his major foreign policy objective ("victory" in Afghanistan) all depend on the continuing improvement in the U.S. position in Iraq. Additional troops to Afghanistan will be contingent on decreasing violence in Iraq. Domestic spending will be partially financed by the "savings" from an Iraq draw-down.

But what if things do not continue to improve in Iraq? What if things get worse? While its currently hard to imagine a scenario that would take us back to the dark days of 2006 (see these stats on the dramatic decline in violence) the possibility of renewed conflict should not be ruled out.

4 unresolved issues in Iraq give me pause:

First, a substantial amount of the decline in violence can bet attributed to the mellowing of Shia militias--especially al Sadr. But these militias are merely dormant rather than defeated. They are keeping quiet for political reasons. Mainly I would attribute this lull in militia activity to improvements between the U.S. and Iran and secondarily to an increasingly assertive Shia central government. Although Obama has expressed greater interest in reaching an understanding with Iran than the Bush clique, animosity between Washington and Tehran is not likely to be resolved overnight. Furthermore the U.S. cannot cede too much in Iraq without upsetting the entire balance of power in the Middle East and enraging the Saudis.

The Saudis and the Sunnis are the second major cause for concern. The Saudis will not be happy with an Iranian dominated Iraq and they will assist Sunni groups to temper the Shia dominated government. Furthermore, the Sunni Awakening continues to depend on American and Saudi money. Let's not forget that the"Awakening" is largely premised on bribery (we are buying off Sunni militias) and that it will be difficult to cut off those financial flows unless Sunni groups have a real place at the table in Baghdad (something the Shia are reluctant to offer).

Third there is continued uncertainty and conflict in the North, particularly surrounding Kirkuk. With vast energy resources, ethnic polarization and the interests of neighboring Turkey at stake, untangling the knots in the North and establishing a new balance of forces there remains one of the major unresolved issues in post-Saddam Iraq.

Finally there is the issue of extremists and international terrorists. Although the Awakening has helped to deny them sanctuary and made the environment more operationally challenging, there remain substantial parts of the country where AQ in Iraq might find space to operate (Diyala province and around Kirkuk come to mind). These groups add an explosive and unpredictable element into the mix. First, as we have seen, the Saudis are not necessarily opposed to using Sunni extremists to further their objectives (as the case in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Lebanon illustrates). Second, there is substantial risk that these groups will launch attacks designed create instability and thus prevent a U.S. draw-down. This later possibility is what keeps me up at night.

As the attacks in Mumbai illustrate, terrorist groups have a keen understanding of the security strategies of the governments they are fighting and they use attacks to compel states to react in specific ways. The attacks in Mumbai were designed to sour relations between India and Pakistan and between the U.S. and India by compelling India to respond militarily on Pakistan's Eastern border and thus create operational space for militants in the FATA and Afghanistan. A renewed campaign of violence in Iraq could be used to slow the redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq to Afghanistan and provide the Taliban with more time and space in the Afghan theater.

To create instability in Iraq terrorists might adopt several strategies: First, attack Iraq's economic infrastructure such as its oil facilities. Two continue to assassinate "collaborators" in the Sunni Awakening movement. Third, launch attacks that stoke sectarian violence (such as as the Golden Dome attack in 2006). Other targets could include pilgrims participating in the Ashura festival (January 7th) as well as Shia political leaders. Fourth, they could undermine the fragile ethnic balance in the North (Mosul and Kirkuk).

Consolidation of recent gains in Iraq (and indeed in the other conflict in Middle Eastern theater such as Lebanon and Gaza) fundamentally depends on two things. First, improving relations between the U.S. and Iran. Establishing a balance between Sunni and Shia groups across the region. This will be a difficult balance for the U.S. to strike.

Improved U.S. Iranian relations are needed on a variety of issues spanning both the South Asian and the Middle Eastern theaters. In South Asia, Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan could prove invaluable. Iran wields considerable influence in Afghanistan especially around Herat and among the country's Shia population (mainly ethnic Hazara's in the center of the country). Perhaps more importantly, Iran provides alternative transportation routes to Afghanistan that could prove enormously valuable if supply lines in Pakistan come under further attack. Finally, India would only be too happy to bring about a rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran. In short, better relations between the U.S. and Iran would offer valuable leverage against Islamabad in Afghanistan and India as well as improve the U.S. and European position in Central Asia more generally (read:Russia).

In the Middle Eastern theater, improved Iran-U.S. relations are essential to stabilizing Iraq and keeping the peace in the Levant. The losers in all of this and those most likely to resist better U.S. Iran relations are Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Israel. In Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan the Saudis have backed Sunni militants to contain Iranian and Shia influence. Pakistan might lose its edge as the primary transport corridor between Central and South Asia and will face stiffer competition in Afghanistan (expect more sectarian violence in Pakistan as well). Finally, although it looks like Israel could gain stability in Lebanon and possibly peace with Syria it might come at the expense of a nuclear capable Iran. Recent reports that Israel is planning an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities without U.S support do not suggest that this is a trade Israel is prepared to accept.

How is it that 7 years in the War on Terror we have come to a point in which U.S. interests are best served by restraining our traditional allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan) and enhancing cooperation with our traditional enemy (Iran)? After 8 years of war and upheaval under the Bush Administration its easy to feel like the world has been turned on its head.