As I wrote in a previous post, the "Great Game" is alive and well. Indeed, U.S. involvement is more extensive than I realized, going back to the early 1990's. Unfortunately few people understand the nature of U.S. and foreign involvement in Central Asia or the reasons behind it. In the most simplistic terms the question is how Central Asian energy supplies can get to world markets? Of crucial importance of course is which markets, which route, and under who's control?
Given the geographic proximity, historical, cultural and economic ties many former Soviet Republics see transport through Russia to the European market as the most viable export route for their energy supplies. But int he post Cold War world, the U.S. and Europe would rather ween these countries off their Russian dependency and diminish Russian influence in region by developing alternative transport routes. The ideal route to get Central Asian energy supplies to the world market and avoid Russian influence is to build pipelines South toward the Gulf and the Arabian sea. From their they can be transported to emerging Asia or to Europe through Suez.
Unfortunately the countries to the south are either U.S. geopolitical rivals (i.e. Iran) or unstable and susceptible to civil war (i.e. Afghanistan). The U.S. famously courted the Taliban in the 1990's in the hope that they could bring enough stability to the war torn country so that Unocal could build a pipeline from Turkmenistan through Western Afghanistan and on the Pakistan and the Arabian Sea. 15 years later the Southern route has yet be be realized and Russia largely maintains its monopoly on the transit of Caspian energy to Europe (minus a few routes that go through the Caucuses and Turkey).
Interested in establishing a bolt hole on the southern periphery of the continent China has built a deep water port in Pakistan's western Baluchistan province at Gwadar. The project suffers from a number of problems. The transport routes from the Caspian are not much safer or more fully developed than they were previously with Afghanistan still in bad shape. Trucking and pipeline construction remain risky business in the Southern and Western provinces of Afghanistan, largely because it requires going through Taliban held territory around Kandahar. Further complicating matter is ethnic and economic friction between Balchi tribes and the Punjabi dominate the central government in Islamabad. Gwadar is operational, but political and economic difficulties have prevented it from blossoming largely because investment in inland infrastructure has been lacking.
In contrast the transport route through Iran from the North eastern city of Mashad down to the port of Chabbar is much more effective (though restive, Iran has actual control over its territory, unlike Pakistan and Afghanistan). So long as the U.S. is determined to isolate Iran and so long as Afghanistan remains at war, the southern route will not be viable for accessing Central Asian resources and markets and the world will depend on Russia for pipelines to the Caspian. The Chinese, too, will likely find their ambitions at Gwadar frustrated by instability.
Rapprochement with Iran is becoming more imperative for more reasons, than ever before.
Friday, December 19, 2008
Petraeus's Cautious Optimism
These days I see more to be cautious about than optimistic. But I have to hand it to him at least Petraeus doesn't make triumphalist comments like Rumsfeld and Cheney. He knows all too well the hard slog ahead.
With elections in both Iraq and Afghanistan in 2009 and the promise of a fresh Taliban offensive in the spring, conditions could easily deteriorate in the first half of next year on both fronts. In Iraq, a small uptick in violence has gone largely unnoticed, but as I suggested in a previous post, the situation is ripe for AQ meddling. Attacks designed to stoke sectarian tension could prevent the U.S. from redeploying as quickly as is now planned. Although the government showed its teeth in 2008 in Basra and Sadr City, it is still fragile. If Parliament is divided over a shoe thrower, imagine what kind of political deadlock could follow potentially controversial elections.
Right now, Obama's presidency essentially hinges on continued progress in Iraq in order to redeploy to Afghanistan and pay for domestic spending. I suspect there will be substantial setbacks to the withdrawal plan in 2009 making Iraq another campaign promise that is more difficult to deliver on than anticipated. Fortunately (or unfortunately, deficits apparently no longer matter, so stay in Iraq as long as you need, its good for the economy!)
With elections in both Iraq and Afghanistan in 2009 and the promise of a fresh Taliban offensive in the spring, conditions could easily deteriorate in the first half of next year on both fronts. In Iraq, a small uptick in violence has gone largely unnoticed, but as I suggested in a previous post, the situation is ripe for AQ meddling. Attacks designed to stoke sectarian tension could prevent the U.S. from redeploying as quickly as is now planned. Although the government showed its teeth in 2008 in Basra and Sadr City, it is still fragile. If Parliament is divided over a shoe thrower, imagine what kind of political deadlock could follow potentially controversial elections.
Right now, Obama's presidency essentially hinges on continued progress in Iraq in order to redeploy to Afghanistan and pay for domestic spending. I suspect there will be substantial setbacks to the withdrawal plan in 2009 making Iraq another campaign promise that is more difficult to deliver on than anticipated. Fortunately (or unfortunately, deficits apparently no longer matter, so stay in Iraq as long as you need, its good for the economy!)
And you thought free trade was contentious here?
Many observers here in the U.S. are wondering where the new administration will stand on free trade. It is yet to be seen whether Obama will govern more base don his campaign positions or will form policy based on what his adviser say. Larry Summers is a strong supporter of free trade, but there is considerable disagreement within the party as the the benefits of free trade for the U.S. Pending free trade agreements with South Korea and Columbia are sure to be contentious, bringing out the farm and labor lobbies. Although the issue is likely to be contentious, (more so at a time when unemployment is rising), it could hardly compare to the raucous "debate" in the South Korean parliament. These guys are frickin nuts! Damn though, that would make 24 hr news way more interesting!
Bringing the Neighbors together
This meeting, and others like it are desperately important. Iranian participation is necessary and hopefully will come with U.S. rapprochement. India can play an important role in helping garner political and diplomatic support from neighboring states and bringing about cooperation between NATO and the neighbors. The Taliban and Islamabad have to know that they face a united front and that a Taliban return to power is not an option. This is a necessary precondition for them entering into a negotiated power-sharing agreement with the government.
Thursday, December 18, 2008
Open Seas (and Abundant Energy): The Real Engine of Globalization
Forget Thomas Friedman and his Lexus factory, his mag lev train and the information superhighway. Important though they are, information and communications technologies are not at the heart of the process we now call globalization. Rather globalization continues to rest, as it has in eras past, on open sea lanes (and abundant energy). These in turn depend on maritime security.
Globalization began when European explorers sailed off in the hope of finding a maritime route to Asia that would allow them to bypass the Ottoman Empire and reduce the cost of overland transport routes along the Silk Road. Originally seeking the spices of India, these explorers first discovered the Americas, where, instead of spices they found abundant gold and silver and cheap native labor (this was to prove fortuitous since the dirty half starved Europeans initially had little to offer to Asian merchants in exchange for spices. Andean gold and silver soon became the currency for European mercantilist power's Asia trade. So it seems the West has, historically speaking, often run a deficit with the Orient).
Just when they were losing the American colonies the British were consolidating their gains on the Subcontinent and thrashing the French, Dutch and Portuguese in the Asian trade. Over the next 80 odd years Great Britain was to establish hegemony on the subcontinent and make India the Jewel in the Queen's imperial crown. India, with its tea, wheat (from the Punjab), textiles, opium, jute, spices, and vast internal market played a central role in the previous era of globalization (the long 19th century from roughly 1787-1914). The transfer of wealth from India to Great Britain (as well as from other colonies) made Britain the "great" country it is today.
This previous era of globalization rested primarily on the British sea power and the liberal (i.e. "free trade") tradition of the Anglo merchants. The British Navy ruled the world's oceans, keeping them safe for imperial commerce from marauding pirates as well as other imperial aspirants seeking "preferential" ( i.e. monopolistic) terms of trade. As the crown Jewel, India was central to this global commercial network making British paramountcy in the Indian Ocean imperative. It also necessitated the control of strategic choke points and the establishment (as naval propulsion evolved from sail to steam) of coaling stations. Thus British control over the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden, the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Malacca was clearly essential for maintaining the security of European-Asian maritime trade.
Although the British Raj and the era of steam and sail of passed, the centrality of open sea lanes, maritime security--particularly the security of the Indian Ocean littoral--for maintaining globalization and East-West trade has not diminished. In at least one respect it has increased: Oil. An enormous volume of oil (indeed all Gulf oil) is transported across the Indian Ocean, and much of it passes through strategic choke points at the Gulf of Aden, Suez, and the Straits of Malacca. Naval security in the Indian Ocean did not diminish in importance with Indian independence and the age of oil. Not only are these sea lanes transport routes for international commerce in general but they are also essential to the secure transport of that special commodity (oil) that makes all other international commerce possible (since today's ships are themselves powered by it).
The decline of the British Empire, Indian independence and the onset of the Cold War all occurred roughly simultaneously. Each event affected Indian Ocean security as well as maritime security more generally. The U.S. and Soviet Union initially did not pay as much attention to naval competition in the Indian Ocean as they were more concerned with maritime security in the Atlantic and Pacific (where they each of access). Additionally, although the British Empire was a shadow of its former self after WWII, the process of decolonization in Asia took some time (they only gave up Hong Kong a decade ago) and the UK maintained a substantial naval capability, particularly in Asia. The Indian Ocean thus largely remained a "British lake" until the 1960's (the Suez crisis in 1956) was a defining moment.
The legacy of the Raj left the India largely without a navy. British global naval superiority did not necessitate the creation of an "Indian navy" and defense planning and resources were primarily focused on developing an Indian army that could defend the empire (as Indian soldiers did in WWI and WWII), protect against Russian aggression in the northwest (i.e. Afghanistan), and maintain internal order.
As British naval dominance in the Indian Ocean declined and with India unable to dedicate resources to developing a comparable naval capability, the superpowers rushed in to fill the "vacuum" in maritime security in the Indian Ocean (the U.S. acquired basing rights at Diego Garcia in 1971). The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 left only the U.S. with a global blue water capability. The invasions of Iraq (both) and Afghanistan make clear that U.S. naval dominance and power projection remains unmatched. But there may be a new naval race developing in the Indian Ocean littoral and the issue of maritime security is again becoming front page news.
Globalization began when European explorers sailed off in the hope of finding a maritime route to Asia that would allow them to bypass the Ottoman Empire and reduce the cost of overland transport routes along the Silk Road. Originally seeking the spices of India, these explorers first discovered the Americas, where, instead of spices they found abundant gold and silver and cheap native labor (this was to prove fortuitous since the dirty half starved Europeans initially had little to offer to Asian merchants in exchange for spices. Andean gold and silver soon became the currency for European mercantilist power's Asia trade. So it seems the West has, historically speaking, often run a deficit with the Orient).
Just when they were losing the American colonies the British were consolidating their gains on the Subcontinent and thrashing the French, Dutch and Portuguese in the Asian trade. Over the next 80 odd years Great Britain was to establish hegemony on the subcontinent and make India the Jewel in the Queen's imperial crown. India, with its tea, wheat (from the Punjab), textiles, opium, jute, spices, and vast internal market played a central role in the previous era of globalization (the long 19th century from roughly 1787-1914). The transfer of wealth from India to Great Britain (as well as from other colonies) made Britain the "great" country it is today.
This previous era of globalization rested primarily on the British sea power and the liberal (i.e. "free trade") tradition of the Anglo merchants. The British Navy ruled the world's oceans, keeping them safe for imperial commerce from marauding pirates as well as other imperial aspirants seeking "preferential" ( i.e. monopolistic) terms of trade. As the crown Jewel, India was central to this global commercial network making British paramountcy in the Indian Ocean imperative. It also necessitated the control of strategic choke points and the establishment (as naval propulsion evolved from sail to steam) of coaling stations. Thus British control over the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden, the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Malacca was clearly essential for maintaining the security of European-Asian maritime trade.
Although the British Raj and the era of steam and sail of passed, the centrality of open sea lanes, maritime security--particularly the security of the Indian Ocean littoral--for maintaining globalization and East-West trade has not diminished. In at least one respect it has increased: Oil. An enormous volume of oil (indeed all Gulf oil) is transported across the Indian Ocean, and much of it passes through strategic choke points at the Gulf of Aden, Suez, and the Straits of Malacca. Naval security in the Indian Ocean did not diminish in importance with Indian independence and the age of oil. Not only are these sea lanes transport routes for international commerce in general but they are also essential to the secure transport of that special commodity (oil) that makes all other international commerce possible (since today's ships are themselves powered by it).
The decline of the British Empire, Indian independence and the onset of the Cold War all occurred roughly simultaneously. Each event affected Indian Ocean security as well as maritime security more generally. The U.S. and Soviet Union initially did not pay as much attention to naval competition in the Indian Ocean as they were more concerned with maritime security in the Atlantic and Pacific (where they each of access). Additionally, although the British Empire was a shadow of its former self after WWII, the process of decolonization in Asia took some time (they only gave up Hong Kong a decade ago) and the UK maintained a substantial naval capability, particularly in Asia. The Indian Ocean thus largely remained a "British lake" until the 1960's (the Suez crisis in 1956) was a defining moment.
The legacy of the Raj left the India largely without a navy. British global naval superiority did not necessitate the creation of an "Indian navy" and defense planning and resources were primarily focused on developing an Indian army that could defend the empire (as Indian soldiers did in WWI and WWII), protect against Russian aggression in the northwest (i.e. Afghanistan), and maintain internal order.
As British naval dominance in the Indian Ocean declined and with India unable to dedicate resources to developing a comparable naval capability, the superpowers rushed in to fill the "vacuum" in maritime security in the Indian Ocean (the U.S. acquired basing rights at Diego Garcia in 1971). The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 left only the U.S. with a global blue water capability. The invasions of Iraq (both) and Afghanistan make clear that U.S. naval dominance and power projection remains unmatched. But there may be a new naval race developing in the Indian Ocean littoral and the issue of maritime security is again becoming front page news.
Monday, December 15, 2008
The Asian Trinagle
I could talk for hours about the fascinating triangular relationship between India, China and Pakistan, but instead I want to leave a few links to recent articles and blogs talking about this "Asian Triangle." The World Politics Review published three insightful articles on the the matter from each countries' perspective. Joshua Foust who contributes to an excellent blog (Registan.net) on Central Asia and Afghanistan notes the WPR articles here and also pointed to several recent article on the subject of China pressuring Pakistan to ban Jamaat ud-Dawa. Myra MacDonald also offered this thought provoking post on her blog for Reuters. Both of them reference this anonymous editorial from the Daily Times claiming that it was Chinese rather than U.S pressure that convinced Pakistan to take action against JD and LeT. Lastly, the always timely column of Sudha Ramachandran (Asia Times) also focused on the recent UNSC sanction of Dawa.
Of course, China allegedly insisted the General Hamid Gul be removed from the UNSC resolution imposing sanctions. And though it is tempting for me to make a joke here about the insightfulness of "Team America" I will restrain myself...
My view of all this is that China chose not to exercise its UNSC veto this time around for a variety of reasons. First, the political and diplomatic pressure on Pakistan right now is intense. To shield Pakistan in this context would result in international condemnation and be used as evidence of China's unreadiness to become a responsible member of the international community. Second, China has legitimate concerns about Uighur terrorism and does not want to see terrorist flourish in Pakistan. Third, it would have damaged improving relations with New Delhi. Fourth, it would have increased the probability of punitive strikes by Delhi. Not only would a major war on the subcontinent be bad for the world economy right now, but China could be pulled into such a conflict. That takes us to a fifth reason. China and Pakistan are close, close allies. China has shared nuclear and missile technology with Pakistan and been Islamabad's most trusted patron. The two countries share a common enemy in India and have each used the other to threaten India (with a second front) during their respective conflicts. While China is likely to keep Pakistan as a "hedge" against India (and any U.S.-India alliance), Beijing is not interested in raising tensions with Delhi right now. Like Pakistan's civilian government and more pragmatic military officials, the Chinese are not interested in being dragged into a conflict with India by a bunch of religious nuts who think that Islam is again going to conquer India.
Undoubtedly the current conversation between China and Pakistan goes something like this:
Pakistan: We did not sponsor this attack. It is true it was planned on our territory and some 'rouge' elements in the military-intelligence services provided ideological and logistical support. But we are not interested in war with India right now. We are economically broken, politically vulnerable and our military is stretched thin. But how can we get rid of the Kashmiri groups? We need them. We have to maintain an asymmetrical capability to compete with India. They [India] are economically much stronger, have conventional superiority, and an emerging alliance with the United States which will undoubtedly allow them to produce more nuclear weapons--maybe even develop a first strike capability? Surely you recognize this also. We need you, and you need us. We can continue to use the asymmetrical threat of terrorism to slow India's growth and ensure that you maintain your lead in the race for Asia. You need us to be able to open a 'second front' if you became involved in a war with India. Finally, we can drive a wedge between Delhi and Washington and keep America tied down in Afghanistan thus affording you more time to develop without the U.S. trying to slow you or encircle you.
China: This is all true. But for now, you have to weigh the benefits of taking what are essentially symbolic actions and the cost of open hostility. For now, it is best to ban the LeT and JD and place some leaders under house arrest. They can always change their name or go "underground" as they have before. You can always release them from prison when the climate is more favorable (as you have before). The world is too fragile for a major war right now. The global economy is bad. We are facing the slowest growth we have seen in decades. 2009 could see mass instability in China. The last thing the world needs right now is a massive war between yourself and India. The economic consequences could be dire. And we are not in a position to come to your aid. We cannot be relied on to open a "second front" if need be. Such an action would also almost certainly require a U.S. response. We cannot be pulled into a war. Furthermore, if we play ball with Washington now, it will be harder for them to call us out when we push for further cooperation later. When the climate is more favourable we can again talk about nuclear cooperation so that you do not have to fear India's nuclear capability. Play along with their demands for now. Give up as little as is possible now, but give up what is necessary in order to avoid open hostility--at least until the constellation of forces is more in our favor.
Of course, China allegedly insisted the General Hamid Gul be removed from the UNSC resolution imposing sanctions. And though it is tempting for me to make a joke here about the insightfulness of "Team America" I will restrain myself...
My view of all this is that China chose not to exercise its UNSC veto this time around for a variety of reasons. First, the political and diplomatic pressure on Pakistan right now is intense. To shield Pakistan in this context would result in international condemnation and be used as evidence of China's unreadiness to become a responsible member of the international community. Second, China has legitimate concerns about Uighur terrorism and does not want to see terrorist flourish in Pakistan. Third, it would have damaged improving relations with New Delhi. Fourth, it would have increased the probability of punitive strikes by Delhi. Not only would a major war on the subcontinent be bad for the world economy right now, but China could be pulled into such a conflict. That takes us to a fifth reason. China and Pakistan are close, close allies. China has shared nuclear and missile technology with Pakistan and been Islamabad's most trusted patron. The two countries share a common enemy in India and have each used the other to threaten India (with a second front) during their respective conflicts. While China is likely to keep Pakistan as a "hedge" against India (and any U.S.-India alliance), Beijing is not interested in raising tensions with Delhi right now. Like Pakistan's civilian government and more pragmatic military officials, the Chinese are not interested in being dragged into a conflict with India by a bunch of religious nuts who think that Islam is again going to conquer India.
Undoubtedly the current conversation between China and Pakistan goes something like this:
Pakistan: We did not sponsor this attack. It is true it was planned on our territory and some 'rouge' elements in the military-intelligence services provided ideological and logistical support. But we are not interested in war with India right now. We are economically broken, politically vulnerable and our military is stretched thin. But how can we get rid of the Kashmiri groups? We need them. We have to maintain an asymmetrical capability to compete with India. They [India] are economically much stronger, have conventional superiority, and an emerging alliance with the United States which will undoubtedly allow them to produce more nuclear weapons--maybe even develop a first strike capability? Surely you recognize this also. We need you, and you need us. We can continue to use the asymmetrical threat of terrorism to slow India's growth and ensure that you maintain your lead in the race for Asia. You need us to be able to open a 'second front' if you became involved in a war with India. Finally, we can drive a wedge between Delhi and Washington and keep America tied down in Afghanistan thus affording you more time to develop without the U.S. trying to slow you or encircle you.
China: This is all true. But for now, you have to weigh the benefits of taking what are essentially symbolic actions and the cost of open hostility. For now, it is best to ban the LeT and JD and place some leaders under house arrest. They can always change their name or go "underground" as they have before. You can always release them from prison when the climate is more favorable (as you have before). The world is too fragile for a major war right now. The global economy is bad. We are facing the slowest growth we have seen in decades. 2009 could see mass instability in China. The last thing the world needs right now is a massive war between yourself and India. The economic consequences could be dire. And we are not in a position to come to your aid. We cannot be relied on to open a "second front" if need be. Such an action would also almost certainly require a U.S. response. We cannot be pulled into a war. Furthermore, if we play ball with Washington now, it will be harder for them to call us out when we push for further cooperation later. When the climate is more favourable we can again talk about nuclear cooperation so that you do not have to fear India's nuclear capability. Play along with their demands for now. Give up as little as is possible now, but give up what is necessary in order to avoid open hostility--at least until the constellation of forces is more in our favor.
Thursday, December 11, 2008
It is, and always has been, a two theater war
With all the of the attention being focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan these days its easy to forget that the bulk of the 200,000 or so U.S. troops actively engaged in the 'War on Terror' remain in Iraq. And although the attention to the 'forgotten war' on Afghanistan is welcome after nearly 6 years of malign neglect, we must not forget that this is, always has been and will continue to be a two 'theater' war against international terrorists and the states and interests that support them. As the new Administration prepares to take office they must recognize that one of the fatal errors made during the Bush presidency was to conceptualize these theaters as being completely distinct conflicts and focus excessively on one to the detriment of the other. The two "theaters" that I am referring to are of course the South Asia theater and the "Arab" or Middle Eastern theater. The new Administration needs to be prepared to focus and fight on both fronts simultaneously.
Instability in Pakistan, the worsening situation in Afghanistan and the Mumbai attacks have all recently drawn attention back to the South Asian theater. Additionally, Obama's hawkish campaign statements about Afghanistan and Pakistan and his remarks about the need to develop a "regional approach" in South Asia have all shifted the discourse towards this neglected theater of Bush's war. Finally improvements in Iraq and Lebanon and a reduction in tensions with Iran have also contributed to the shift in focus to the East.
Yet it would be a major mistake to turn our attention too far away from the situation in Iraq. Obama's domestic spending priorities and his major foreign policy objective ("victory" in Afghanistan) all depend on the continuing improvement in the U.S. position in Iraq. Additional troops to Afghanistan will be contingent on decreasing violence in Iraq. Domestic spending will be partially financed by the "savings" from an Iraq draw-down.
But what if things do not continue to improve in Iraq? What if things get worse? While its currently hard to imagine a scenario that would take us back to the dark days of 2006 (see these stats on the dramatic decline in violence) the possibility of renewed conflict should not be ruled out.
4 unresolved issues in Iraq give me pause:
First, a substantial amount of the decline in violence can bet attributed to the mellowing of Shia militias--especially al Sadr. But these militias are merely dormant rather than defeated. They are keeping quiet for political reasons. Mainly I would attribute this lull in militia activity to improvements between the U.S. and Iran and secondarily to an increasingly assertive Shia central government. Although Obama has expressed greater interest in reaching an understanding with Iran than the Bush clique, animosity between Washington and Tehran is not likely to be resolved overnight. Furthermore the U.S. cannot cede too much in Iraq without upsetting the entire balance of power in the Middle East and enraging the Saudis.
The Saudis and the Sunnis are the second major cause for concern. The Saudis will not be happy with an Iranian dominated Iraq and they will assist Sunni groups to temper the Shia dominated government. Furthermore, the Sunni Awakening continues to depend on American and Saudi money. Let's not forget that the"Awakening" is largely premised on bribery (we are buying off Sunni militias) and that it will be difficult to cut off those financial flows unless Sunni groups have a real place at the table in Baghdad (something the Shia are reluctant to offer).
Third there is continued uncertainty and conflict in the North, particularly surrounding Kirkuk. With vast energy resources, ethnic polarization and the interests of neighboring Turkey at stake, untangling the knots in the North and establishing a new balance of forces there remains one of the major unresolved issues in post-Saddam Iraq.
Finally there is the issue of extremists and international terrorists. Although the Awakening has helped to deny them sanctuary and made the environment more operationally challenging, there remain substantial parts of the country where AQ in Iraq might find space to operate (Diyala province and around Kirkuk come to mind). These groups add an explosive and unpredictable element into the mix. First, as we have seen, the Saudis are not necessarily opposed to using Sunni extremists to further their objectives (as the case in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Lebanon illustrates). Second, there is substantial risk that these groups will launch attacks designed create instability and thus prevent a U.S. draw-down. This later possibility is what keeps me up at night.
As the attacks in Mumbai illustrate, terrorist groups have a keen understanding of the security strategies of the governments they are fighting and they use attacks to compel states to react in specific ways. The attacks in Mumbai were designed to sour relations between India and Pakistan and between the U.S. and India by compelling India to respond militarily on Pakistan's Eastern border and thus create operational space for militants in the FATA and Afghanistan. A renewed campaign of violence in Iraq could be used to slow the redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq to Afghanistan and provide the Taliban with more time and space in the Afghan theater.
To create instability in Iraq terrorists might adopt several strategies: First, attack Iraq's economic infrastructure such as its oil facilities. Two continue to assassinate "collaborators" in the Sunni Awakening movement. Third, launch attacks that stoke sectarian violence (such as as the Golden Dome attack in 2006). Other targets could include pilgrims participating in the Ashura festival (January 7th) as well as Shia political leaders. Fourth, they could undermine the fragile ethnic balance in the North (Mosul and Kirkuk).
Consolidation of recent gains in Iraq (and indeed in the other conflict in Middle Eastern theater such as Lebanon and Gaza) fundamentally depends on two things. First, improving relations between the U.S. and Iran. Establishing a balance between Sunni and Shia groups across the region. This will be a difficult balance for the U.S. to strike.
Improved U.S. Iranian relations are needed on a variety of issues spanning both the South Asian and the Middle Eastern theaters. In South Asia, Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan could prove invaluable. Iran wields considerable influence in Afghanistan especially around Herat and among the country's Shia population (mainly ethnic Hazara's in the center of the country). Perhaps more importantly, Iran provides alternative transportation routes to Afghanistan that could prove enormously valuable if supply lines in Pakistan come under further attack. Finally, India would only be too happy to bring about a rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran. In short, better relations between the U.S. and Iran would offer valuable leverage against Islamabad in Afghanistan and India as well as improve the U.S. and European position in Central Asia more generally (read:Russia).
In the Middle Eastern theater, improved Iran-U.S. relations are essential to stabilizing Iraq and keeping the peace in the Levant. The losers in all of this and those most likely to resist better U.S. Iran relations are Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Israel. In Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan the Saudis have backed Sunni militants to contain Iranian and Shia influence. Pakistan might lose its edge as the primary transport corridor between Central and South Asia and will face stiffer competition in Afghanistan (expect more sectarian violence in Pakistan as well). Finally, although it looks like Israel could gain stability in Lebanon and possibly peace with Syria it might come at the expense of a nuclear capable Iran. Recent reports that Israel is planning an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities without U.S support do not suggest that this is a trade Israel is prepared to accept.
How is it that 7 years in the War on Terror we have come to a point in which U.S. interests are best served by restraining our traditional allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan) and enhancing cooperation with our traditional enemy (Iran)? After 8 years of war and upheaval under the Bush Administration its easy to feel like the world has been turned on its head.
Instability in Pakistan, the worsening situation in Afghanistan and the Mumbai attacks have all recently drawn attention back to the South Asian theater. Additionally, Obama's hawkish campaign statements about Afghanistan and Pakistan and his remarks about the need to develop a "regional approach" in South Asia have all shifted the discourse towards this neglected theater of Bush's war. Finally improvements in Iraq and Lebanon and a reduction in tensions with Iran have also contributed to the shift in focus to the East.
Yet it would be a major mistake to turn our attention too far away from the situation in Iraq. Obama's domestic spending priorities and his major foreign policy objective ("victory" in Afghanistan) all depend on the continuing improvement in the U.S. position in Iraq. Additional troops to Afghanistan will be contingent on decreasing violence in Iraq. Domestic spending will be partially financed by the "savings" from an Iraq draw-down.
But what if things do not continue to improve in Iraq? What if things get worse? While its currently hard to imagine a scenario that would take us back to the dark days of 2006 (see these stats on the dramatic decline in violence) the possibility of renewed conflict should not be ruled out.
4 unresolved issues in Iraq give me pause:
First, a substantial amount of the decline in violence can bet attributed to the mellowing of Shia militias--especially al Sadr. But these militias are merely dormant rather than defeated. They are keeping quiet for political reasons. Mainly I would attribute this lull in militia activity to improvements between the U.S. and Iran and secondarily to an increasingly assertive Shia central government. Although Obama has expressed greater interest in reaching an understanding with Iran than the Bush clique, animosity between Washington and Tehran is not likely to be resolved overnight. Furthermore the U.S. cannot cede too much in Iraq without upsetting the entire balance of power in the Middle East and enraging the Saudis.
The Saudis and the Sunnis are the second major cause for concern. The Saudis will not be happy with an Iranian dominated Iraq and they will assist Sunni groups to temper the Shia dominated government. Furthermore, the Sunni Awakening continues to depend on American and Saudi money. Let's not forget that the"Awakening" is largely premised on bribery (we are buying off Sunni militias) and that it will be difficult to cut off those financial flows unless Sunni groups have a real place at the table in Baghdad (something the Shia are reluctant to offer).
Third there is continued uncertainty and conflict in the North, particularly surrounding Kirkuk. With vast energy resources, ethnic polarization and the interests of neighboring Turkey at stake, untangling the knots in the North and establishing a new balance of forces there remains one of the major unresolved issues in post-Saddam Iraq.
Finally there is the issue of extremists and international terrorists. Although the Awakening has helped to deny them sanctuary and made the environment more operationally challenging, there remain substantial parts of the country where AQ in Iraq might find space to operate (Diyala province and around Kirkuk come to mind). These groups add an explosive and unpredictable element into the mix. First, as we have seen, the Saudis are not necessarily opposed to using Sunni extremists to further their objectives (as the case in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Lebanon illustrates). Second, there is substantial risk that these groups will launch attacks designed create instability and thus prevent a U.S. draw-down. This later possibility is what keeps me up at night.
As the attacks in Mumbai illustrate, terrorist groups have a keen understanding of the security strategies of the governments they are fighting and they use attacks to compel states to react in specific ways. The attacks in Mumbai were designed to sour relations between India and Pakistan and between the U.S. and India by compelling India to respond militarily on Pakistan's Eastern border and thus create operational space for militants in the FATA and Afghanistan. A renewed campaign of violence in Iraq could be used to slow the redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq to Afghanistan and provide the Taliban with more time and space in the Afghan theater.
To create instability in Iraq terrorists might adopt several strategies: First, attack Iraq's economic infrastructure such as its oil facilities. Two continue to assassinate "collaborators" in the Sunni Awakening movement. Third, launch attacks that stoke sectarian violence (such as as the Golden Dome attack in 2006). Other targets could include pilgrims participating in the Ashura festival (January 7th) as well as Shia political leaders. Fourth, they could undermine the fragile ethnic balance in the North (Mosul and Kirkuk).
Consolidation of recent gains in Iraq (and indeed in the other conflict in Middle Eastern theater such as Lebanon and Gaza) fundamentally depends on two things. First, improving relations between the U.S. and Iran. Establishing a balance between Sunni and Shia groups across the region. This will be a difficult balance for the U.S. to strike.
Improved U.S. Iranian relations are needed on a variety of issues spanning both the South Asian and the Middle Eastern theaters. In South Asia, Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan could prove invaluable. Iran wields considerable influence in Afghanistan especially around Herat and among the country's Shia population (mainly ethnic Hazara's in the center of the country). Perhaps more importantly, Iran provides alternative transportation routes to Afghanistan that could prove enormously valuable if supply lines in Pakistan come under further attack. Finally, India would only be too happy to bring about a rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran. In short, better relations between the U.S. and Iran would offer valuable leverage against Islamabad in Afghanistan and India as well as improve the U.S. and European position in Central Asia more generally (read:Russia).
In the Middle Eastern theater, improved Iran-U.S. relations are essential to stabilizing Iraq and keeping the peace in the Levant. The losers in all of this and those most likely to resist better U.S. Iran relations are Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Israel. In Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan the Saudis have backed Sunni militants to contain Iranian and Shia influence. Pakistan might lose its edge as the primary transport corridor between Central and South Asia and will face stiffer competition in Afghanistan (expect more sectarian violence in Pakistan as well). Finally, although it looks like Israel could gain stability in Lebanon and possibly peace with Syria it might come at the expense of a nuclear capable Iran. Recent reports that Israel is planning an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities without U.S support do not suggest that this is a trade Israel is prepared to accept.
How is it that 7 years in the War on Terror we have come to a point in which U.S. interests are best served by restraining our traditional allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan) and enhancing cooperation with our traditional enemy (Iran)? After 8 years of war and upheaval under the Bush Administration its easy to feel like the world has been turned on its head.
Wednesday, November 26, 2008
Unconsolidated States, Resources Scarcity, and Emerging Powers
As this article makes clear Myanmar seems destined to play an important (perhaps 'pivotal') role in the emerging Asian balance of power. Recent discoveries of offshore natural gas just raise the stakes. Myanmar is critical for fulfilling China's 'two ocean' strategy. Rumors that China had established a radar station in Myanmar set off alarm bells in Delhi, as such an installation could be used to monitor Indian missile tests from launch sites in Orissa. China is also investing heavily in infrastructure (especially in the country's north) to facilitate trade with China's landlocked southern provinces. Rumors have even circulated that the Chinese would like to build oil and gas pipelines from the Indian Ocean through Myanmar to mainland China.
India for its part is belatedly coming to the conclusion that if it wants to compete for influence it will first have to stop criticizing the junta for being undemocratic. India would like better relations with Myanmar to control the flow of insurgents on their shared border, expand trade, deny China access to the Indian Ocean.
India for its part is belatedly coming to the conclusion that if it wants to compete for influence it will first have to stop criticizing the junta for being undemocratic. India would like better relations with Myanmar to control the flow of insurgents on their shared border, expand trade, deny China access to the Indian Ocean.
The "Great Game" alive and well
Another article discussing a pipeline proposal designed to extract Central Asian energy and bypass the mob in Moscow. The key to unlocking Central Asian energy seems (at least these days) to run through Baku or, dare I say it, Tehran...? Building transport routes through Azerbaijan that avoid the 'frontline' in Georgia is of growing importance given Saakashvili's potentially precarious situation in Tiblisi. Resolving the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh might help to free up a more direct route between Azerbaijan, Turkey and the Mediterranean but that could be easier said than done. And even then, Armenia is perhaps Moscow's closest ally in the region.
Of course the other potential transport route for Central Asian energy is through Iran. Many would argue that Iran is actually the best route to transport Caspian energy to world markets. Yet without some kind of rapprochement with the U.S., Iran is probably to be too risky for investment. For now the Caucasus will probably remain the primary non-Russian link between Europe and Central Asian energy.
Good map and overview of Caspian energy from Energy Information Administration here
Of course the other potential transport route for Central Asian energy is through Iran. Many would argue that Iran is actually the best route to transport Caspian energy to world markets. Yet without some kind of rapprochement with the U.S., Iran is probably to be too risky for investment. For now the Caucasus will probably remain the primary non-Russian link between Europe and Central Asian energy.
Good map and overview of Caspian energy from Energy Information Administration here
Growth and Stability in China
The economic contraction may be more severe in North America and Europe, but it seems increasingly clear that the social and political fallout will be felt most in developing countries. China could be in for a rough ride over the next two years as global demand slows and its exports fall off a cliff. The central bank lowered rates again today by a full percentage point. Meanwhile, the World Bank revised its growth forecast for China from 9.2 to 7.5 percent in 2009. That will be the slowest growth for China in over 2 decades.
China essentially needs to keep its GDP growth above 9 percent in order to keep pace with the expansion in its labor force. With growth expected to slip considerably below that next year the employment picture looks increasingly bleak. Party officials area already beginning to raise concerns about the potential impact on social stability that a sharp rise in unemployment might have. Recent clashes may be an ominous sign of things to come.
While the economic contraction in the OECD is likely to be more severe these countries more fully developed economic and especially political institutions are much better position to deal with the crisis than most developing countries. Among the BRIC countries, the two democracies (Brazil and India) may have an edge in dealing with associated social unrest. Although the crisis will certainly make the environment more challenging for incumbent governments in Delhi and Brasilia, both political systems are far more flexible than in China and Russia. It remains to be seen as to how well the latter more autocratic governments can cope with greater social volatility. In Russia I suspect a combination of intimidation, bribery and cunning will suffice to keep Putin on top. In China, the application of brute force is likely to be forthcoming but may prove less effective given the potential scale of any unrest.
China essentially needs to keep its GDP growth above 9 percent in order to keep pace with the expansion in its labor force. With growth expected to slip considerably below that next year the employment picture looks increasingly bleak. Party officials area already beginning to raise concerns about the potential impact on social stability that a sharp rise in unemployment might have. Recent clashes may be an ominous sign of things to come.
While the economic contraction in the OECD is likely to be more severe these countries more fully developed economic and especially political institutions are much better position to deal with the crisis than most developing countries. Among the BRIC countries, the two democracies (Brazil and India) may have an edge in dealing with associated social unrest. Although the crisis will certainly make the environment more challenging for incumbent governments in Delhi and Brasilia, both political systems are far more flexible than in China and Russia. It remains to be seen as to how well the latter more autocratic governments can cope with greater social volatility. In Russia I suspect a combination of intimidation, bribery and cunning will suffice to keep Putin on top. In China, the application of brute force is likely to be forthcoming but may prove less effective given the potential scale of any unrest.
Tuesday, November 25, 2008
A Trade Worth Making...? What Did We Just Trade...?
This fascinating op-ed by a renowned Tibet scholar at Columbia University has potentially important implications (particularly for regional security in South Asia). According to the author, the British government recently reversed its position on support for Tibetan autonomy in exchange for Chinese cooperation in responding to the global financial crisis. While such a move may seem like a small belated gesture of little significance given China's firm grip on Tibet the implications of the new British policy could be much larger:
"Britain’s change of heart risks tearing up a historical record that frames the international order and could provide the basis for resolving China’s dispute with Tibet....But the decision has wider implications. India’s claim to a part of its northeast territories, for example, is largely based on the same agreements — notes exchanged during the Simla convention of 1914, which set the boundary between India and Tibet — that the British appear to have just discarded. That may seem minor to London, but it was over those same documents that a major war between India and China was fought in 1962, as well as a smaller conflict in 1987."
If Britain accedes to Chinese claims over Tibet, have they not also by implication nullified the Simla Accord and thus raised anew the legitimacy of the entire Sino-Indian border? Could this reversal of policy possibly have come at a worse time? Talks between the Dalai Lama and Beijing recently collapsed in acrimony. Just last weekend Tibetan exiles met in Dharmasala to discuss the future of their movement. Apparently many younger Tibetan exiles are even calling into question the efficacy of the Dalai Lama's non-violent "middle way." Could the timing or political message possibly have been a coincidence?
Perhaps. Or perhaps not. Perhaps Britain is signalling that at least on the issue of Tibet it is willing to recognize Beijing's territorial claims in exchange for China becoming a 'responsible stakeholder' in international institutions and the management of the international system?
Is this a worthy trade? Is it Britain's to make? What else might need to be offered in order to get Chinese 'buy in?' Without becoming alarmist, would this constitute appeasement?
"Britain’s change of heart risks tearing up a historical record that frames the international order and could provide the basis for resolving China’s dispute with Tibet....But the decision has wider implications. India’s claim to a part of its northeast territories, for example, is largely based on the same agreements — notes exchanged during the Simla convention of 1914, which set the boundary between India and Tibet — that the British appear to have just discarded. That may seem minor to London, but it was over those same documents that a major war between India and China was fought in 1962, as well as a smaller conflict in 1987."
If Britain accedes to Chinese claims over Tibet, have they not also by implication nullified the Simla Accord and thus raised anew the legitimacy of the entire Sino-Indian border? Could this reversal of policy possibly have come at a worse time? Talks between the Dalai Lama and Beijing recently collapsed in acrimony. Just last weekend Tibetan exiles met in Dharmasala to discuss the future of their movement. Apparently many younger Tibetan exiles are even calling into question the efficacy of the Dalai Lama's non-violent "middle way." Could the timing or political message possibly have been a coincidence?
Perhaps. Or perhaps not. Perhaps Britain is signalling that at least on the issue of Tibet it is willing to recognize Beijing's territorial claims in exchange for China becoming a 'responsible stakeholder' in international institutions and the management of the international system?
Is this a worthy trade? Is it Britain's to make? What else might need to be offered in order to get Chinese 'buy in?' Without becoming alarmist, would this constitute appeasement?
Monday, November 24, 2008
Ode to Zakaria
Fareed,
I love you man, your delicate coif, your freakishly white teeth and huge smile that says "Thank god you and I don't live in Dharavi."
But you also usually have interesting things to say especially for such a "mainstream" commentator. Your op-ed raised a couple of interesting points albeit in an excessively Tom Friedman fashion.
Nonetheless that you read and listen to economists like Stiglitz and historians like Ferguson (a personal fav of mine) is a pleasant reminder as to why you became the youngest editor of Foreign Affairs and Newsweek and why your show GPS continues to provide some of the best coverage of foreign affairs on television.
I love you man, your delicate coif, your freakishly white teeth and huge smile that says "Thank god you and I don't live in Dharavi."
But you also usually have interesting things to say especially for such a "mainstream" commentator. Your op-ed raised a couple of interesting points albeit in an excessively Tom Friedman fashion.
Nonetheless that you read and listen to economists like Stiglitz and historians like Ferguson (a personal fav of mine) is a pleasant reminder as to why you became the youngest editor of Foreign Affairs and Newsweek and why your show GPS continues to provide some of the best coverage of foreign affairs on television.
Rethinking U.S. Policy Towards Latin America? How about formulating a Latin America policy...?
Although the Bush Administration's foreign policy has been characterized by numerous failures one of the least often discussed has been the absence of a coherent Latin America (LA) policy. Other than keeping cozy with Uribe and Columbia, negotiating free trade agreements, denouncing Chavez and other insubordinate national leaders, has the Bush Administration actually developed a policy towards Latin America? At best our LA policy could be described as benign neglect.
Well, its transition time, and members of the "government in waiting" at various think tanks around town are vying for their place at the table (its time to dust off those policy proposals we didn't offer for the last few years cause we were golfing). The Brookings Institutions recently released a report "Re-Thinking U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World"
Well, surprise surprise, the report calls for the new administration to put Latin America at the center (or at least on) its "foreign policy radar" (i.e. we understand that you sank virtually all our diplomatic and military resources into the sands of the Middle East for the last 8 years, but frankly the U.S. is a BIG country and we have the bandwidth to pursue a coherent policy in multiple regions of the world at the same time).
And while the Brookings report undoubtedly lays the groundwork for a more coherent Latin America policy than has been pursued under Bush, one also suspects that it does not fully account for the changes in the region that are likely to result from the global financial crisis (Cue Karen, this is your chance to expound on the trajectory of the region in the coming year).
Latin America is likely to be hard hit by the drying up of international credit, the crash in commodity prices, and slower export growth resulting form slower global growth. Yet some countries are undoubtedly better prepared to weather the crisis than others. Some like Brazil learned the lessons of the 1980s and 1990s. Others like Venezuela, which decided to retry price controls and a command economy (which is all good and well when oil is at $150/barrel but really becomes difficult when its at $40/ barrel) are likely to face some very difficult times.
U.S. engagement in the region is essential. There is a case to be made that Latin America is at a real turning point. Countries can either become nostalgic for their populist and authoritarian traditions or follow the example of leaders like Brazil and Chile who offer new models of development. The financial crisis may create a window of opportunity to arrest the Chavista drift in the region and give legitimacy to more cautious and pragmatic voices. The U.S. needs to arrest its own Latin America policy drift and foster an environment where those moderate voices can thrive. Having enough respect for the countries in the region to formulate coherent policies towards them is a good first step in that direction.
Well, its transition time, and members of the "government in waiting" at various think tanks around town are vying for their place at the table (its time to dust off those policy proposals we didn't offer for the last few years cause we were golfing). The Brookings Institutions recently released a report "Re-Thinking U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World"
Well, surprise surprise, the report calls for the new administration to put Latin America at the center (or at least on) its "foreign policy radar" (i.e. we understand that you sank virtually all our diplomatic and military resources into the sands of the Middle East for the last 8 years, but frankly the U.S. is a BIG country and we have the bandwidth to pursue a coherent policy in multiple regions of the world at the same time).
And while the Brookings report undoubtedly lays the groundwork for a more coherent Latin America policy than has been pursued under Bush, one also suspects that it does not fully account for the changes in the region that are likely to result from the global financial crisis (Cue Karen, this is your chance to expound on the trajectory of the region in the coming year).
Latin America is likely to be hard hit by the drying up of international credit, the crash in commodity prices, and slower export growth resulting form slower global growth. Yet some countries are undoubtedly better prepared to weather the crisis than others. Some like Brazil learned the lessons of the 1980s and 1990s. Others like Venezuela, which decided to retry price controls and a command economy (which is all good and well when oil is at $150/barrel but really becomes difficult when its at $40/ barrel) are likely to face some very difficult times.
U.S. engagement in the region is essential. There is a case to be made that Latin America is at a real turning point. Countries can either become nostalgic for their populist and authoritarian traditions or follow the example of leaders like Brazil and Chile who offer new models of development. The financial crisis may create a window of opportunity to arrest the Chavista drift in the region and give legitimacy to more cautious and pragmatic voices. The U.S. needs to arrest its own Latin America policy drift and foster an environment where those moderate voices can thrive. Having enough respect for the countries in the region to formulate coherent policies towards them is a good first step in that direction.
Sobriety from Bill Kristol?
I was startlingly amazed that Bill Kristol actually managed to produce a column that was well reasoned, moderate and agreeable. I mean is it possible that the arch-conservative just gave President elect Obama a compliment (albeit one that comes at the expense of the democratic congress and the economics profession)?
What will the liberals say? Will they find it possible to support Obama if he enacts pragmatic and centrist policies that even conservative intellectuals support?
What will the liberals say? Will they find it possible to support Obama if he enacts pragmatic and centrist policies that even conservative intellectuals support?
Friday, November 21, 2008
Not another F$%@ing "Analyst!"
Really, come on, does the world really need another F&^$ing "analyst?"
Undoubtedly the answer is no. Yet I have chosen to throw my hat in with the lot because if all the other sops out there can (without mirth) proclaim themselves to be "analysts" of any considerable worth then why not me? At least I have the decency to be self deprecating about it and admit that I am among the "couch potato" analysts. But don't let the name fool you, for I intend to address serious issues with this blog and intend to address them in a serious (even highfalutin) way, because as those of you who know me are keenly aware, I take myself very, very seriously (stop reminding me!).
This blog is dedicated to my good friend, roommate and consummate intellectual rival (one of several): Karen. Karen, as you have so strongly urged me to join the world of blogging heads I now expect that you will at least periodically grace this page with your presence and continue to give my maniacal rantings an audience. Indeed I sincerely hope that you (and our other wonkish colleagues) will in time join in this exercise in intellectual masturbation.
Indeed I invite participation from all quarters. Contributions, comments, and disagreements are not simply welcome but will be essential to the success of this forum.
For now, the umbrella topic for this blog will be issues in contemporary world politics. Over time I hope to narrow this ginormous subject down into a variety of more focused thematic areas. And of course I hope that in due time, the input and active participation of others will help to determine the issues under consideration and their treatment. I suspect that much of the conversation will be drawn from or inspired by daily headlines but I hope in time to delve in more depth and detail into other topics.
For know I will start with basic daily news analysis from the comfy confines of my lazy-boy...
Undoubtedly the answer is no. Yet I have chosen to throw my hat in with the lot because if all the other sops out there can (without mirth) proclaim themselves to be "analysts" of any considerable worth then why not me? At least I have the decency to be self deprecating about it and admit that I am among the "couch potato" analysts. But don't let the name fool you, for I intend to address serious issues with this blog and intend to address them in a serious (even highfalutin) way, because as those of you who know me are keenly aware, I take myself very, very seriously (stop reminding me!).
This blog is dedicated to my good friend, roommate and consummate intellectual rival (one of several): Karen. Karen, as you have so strongly urged me to join the world of blogging heads I now expect that you will at least periodically grace this page with your presence and continue to give my maniacal rantings an audience. Indeed I sincerely hope that you (and our other wonkish colleagues) will in time join in this exercise in intellectual masturbation.
Indeed I invite participation from all quarters. Contributions, comments, and disagreements are not simply welcome but will be essential to the success of this forum.
For now, the umbrella topic for this blog will be issues in contemporary world politics. Over time I hope to narrow this ginormous subject down into a variety of more focused thematic areas. And of course I hope that in due time, the input and active participation of others will help to determine the issues under consideration and their treatment. I suspect that much of the conversation will be drawn from or inspired by daily headlines but I hope in time to delve in more depth and detail into other topics.
For know I will start with basic daily news analysis from the comfy confines of my lazy-boy...
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