Wednesday, November 26, 2008

Unconsolidated States, Resources Scarcity, and Emerging Powers

As this article makes clear Myanmar seems destined to play an important (perhaps 'pivotal') role in the emerging Asian balance of power. Recent discoveries of offshore natural gas just raise the stakes. Myanmar is critical for fulfilling China's 'two ocean' strategy. Rumors that China had established a radar station in Myanmar set off alarm bells in Delhi, as such an installation could be used to monitor Indian missile tests from launch sites in Orissa. China is also investing heavily in infrastructure (especially in the country's north) to facilitate trade with China's landlocked southern provinces. Rumors have even circulated that the Chinese would like to build oil and gas pipelines from the Indian Ocean through Myanmar to mainland China.

India for its part is belatedly coming to the conclusion that if it wants to compete for influence it will first have to stop criticizing the junta for being undemocratic. India would like better relations with Myanmar to control the flow of insurgents on their shared border, expand trade, deny China access to the Indian Ocean.

The "Great Game" alive and well

Another article discussing a pipeline proposal designed to extract Central Asian energy and bypass the mob in Moscow. The key to unlocking Central Asian energy seems (at least these days) to run through Baku or, dare I say it, Tehran...? Building transport routes through Azerbaijan that avoid the 'frontline' in Georgia is of growing importance given Saakashvili's potentially precarious situation in Tiblisi. Resolving the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh might help to free up a more direct route between Azerbaijan, Turkey and the Mediterranean but that could be easier said than done. And even then, Armenia is perhaps Moscow's closest ally in the region.

Of course the other potential transport route for Central Asian energy is through Iran. Many would argue that Iran is actually the best route to transport Caspian energy to world markets. Yet without some kind of rapprochement with the U.S., Iran is probably to be too risky for investment. For now the Caucasus will probably remain the primary non-Russian link between Europe and Central Asian energy.

Good map and overview of Caspian energy from Energy Information Administration here

Growth and Stability in China

The economic contraction may be more severe in North America and Europe, but it seems increasingly clear that the social and political fallout will be felt most in developing countries. China could be in for a rough ride over the next two years as global demand slows and its exports fall off a cliff. The central bank lowered rates again today by a full percentage point. Meanwhile, the World Bank revised its growth forecast for China from 9.2 to 7.5 percent in 2009. That will be the slowest growth for China in over 2 decades.

China essentially needs to keep its GDP growth above 9 percent in order to keep pace with the expansion in its labor force. With growth expected to slip considerably below that next year the employment picture looks increasingly bleak. Party officials area already beginning to raise concerns about the potential impact on social stability that a sharp rise in unemployment might have. Recent clashes may be an ominous sign of things to come.

While the economic contraction in the OECD is likely to be more severe these countries more fully developed economic and especially political institutions are much better position to deal with the crisis than most developing countries. Among the BRIC countries, the two democracies (Brazil and India) may have an edge in dealing with associated social unrest. Although the crisis will certainly make the environment more challenging for incumbent governments in Delhi and Brasilia, both political systems are far more flexible than in China and Russia. It remains to be seen as to how well the latter more autocratic governments can cope with greater social volatility. In Russia I suspect a combination of intimidation, bribery and cunning will suffice to keep Putin on top. In China, the application of brute force is likely to be forthcoming but may prove less effective given the potential scale of any unrest.

Tuesday, November 25, 2008

A Trade Worth Making...? What Did We Just Trade...?

This fascinating op-ed by a renowned Tibet scholar at Columbia University has potentially important implications (particularly for regional security in South Asia). According to the author, the British government recently reversed its position on support for Tibetan autonomy in exchange for Chinese cooperation in responding to the global financial crisis. While such a move may seem like a small belated gesture of little significance given China's firm grip on Tibet the implications of the new British policy could be much larger:


"Britain’s change of heart risks tearing up a historical record that frames the international order and could provide the basis for resolving China’s dispute with Tibet....But the decision has wider implications. India’s claim to a part of its northeast territories, for example, is largely based on the same agreements — notes exchanged during the Simla convention of 1914, which set the boundary between India and Tibet — that the British appear to have just discarded. That may seem minor to London, but it was over those same documents that a major war between India and China was fought in 1962, as well as a smaller conflict in 1987."


If Britain accedes to Chinese claims over Tibet, have they not also by implication nullified the Simla Accord and thus raised anew the legitimacy of the entire Sino-Indian border? Could this reversal of policy possibly have come at a worse time? Talks between the Dalai Lama and Beijing recently collapsed in acrimony. Just last weekend Tibetan exiles met in Dharmasala to discuss the future of their movement. Apparently many younger Tibetan exiles are even calling into question the efficacy of the Dalai Lama's non-violent "middle way." Could the timing or political message possibly have been a coincidence?

Perhaps. Or perhaps not. Perhaps Britain is signalling that at least on the issue of Tibet it is willing to recognize Beijing's territorial claims in exchange for China becoming a 'responsible stakeholder' in international institutions and the management of the international system?

Is this a worthy trade? Is it Britain's to make? What else might need to be offered in order to get Chinese 'buy in?' Without becoming alarmist, would this constitute appeasement?

Monday, November 24, 2008

Ode to Zakaria

Fareed,

I love you man, your delicate coif, your freakishly white teeth and huge smile that says "Thank god you and I don't live in Dharavi."

But you also usually have interesting things to say especially for such a "mainstream" commentator. Your op-ed raised a couple of interesting points albeit in an excessively Tom Friedman fashion.

Nonetheless that you read and listen to economists like Stiglitz and historians like Ferguson (a personal fav of mine) is a pleasant reminder as to why you became the youngest editor of Foreign Affairs and Newsweek and why your show GPS continues to provide some of the best coverage of foreign affairs on television.

Rethinking U.S. Policy Towards Latin America? How about formulating a Latin America policy...?

Although the Bush Administration's foreign policy has been characterized by numerous failures one of the least often discussed has been the absence of a coherent Latin America (LA) policy. Other than keeping cozy with Uribe and Columbia, negotiating free trade agreements, denouncing Chavez and other insubordinate national leaders, has the Bush Administration actually developed a policy towards Latin America? At best our LA policy could be described as benign neglect.

Well, its transition time, and members of the "government in waiting" at various think tanks around town are vying for their place at the table (its time to dust off those policy proposals we didn't offer for the last few years cause we were golfing). The Brookings Institutions recently released a report "Re-Thinking U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World"

Well, surprise surprise, the report calls for the new administration to put Latin America at the center (or at least on) its "foreign policy radar" (i.e. we understand that you sank virtually all our diplomatic and military resources into the sands of the Middle East for the last 8 years, but frankly the U.S. is a BIG country and we have the bandwidth to pursue a coherent policy in multiple regions of the world at the same time).

And while the Brookings report undoubtedly lays the groundwork for a more coherent Latin America policy than has been pursued under Bush, one also suspects that it does not fully account for the changes in the region that are likely to result from the global financial crisis (Cue Karen, this is your chance to expound on the trajectory of the region in the coming year).

Latin America is likely to be hard hit by the drying up of international credit, the crash in commodity prices, and slower export growth resulting form slower global growth. Yet some countries are undoubtedly better prepared to weather the crisis than others. Some like Brazil learned the lessons of the 1980s and 1990s. Others like Venezuela, which decided to retry price controls and a command economy (which is all good and well when oil is at $150/barrel but really becomes difficult when its at $40/ barrel) are likely to face some very difficult times.

U.S. engagement in the region is essential. There is a case to be made that Latin America is at a real turning point. Countries can either become nostalgic for their populist and authoritarian traditions or follow the example of leaders like Brazil and Chile who offer new models of development. The financial crisis may create a window of opportunity to arrest the Chavista drift in the region and give legitimacy to more cautious and pragmatic voices. The U.S. needs to arrest its own Latin America policy drift and foster an environment where those moderate voices can thrive. Having enough respect for the countries in the region to formulate coherent policies towards them is a good first step in that direction.

Sobriety from Bill Kristol?

I was startlingly amazed that Bill Kristol actually managed to produce a column that was well reasoned, moderate and agreeable. I mean is it possible that the arch-conservative just gave President elect Obama a compliment (albeit one that comes at the expense of the democratic congress and the economics profession)?

What will the liberals say? Will they find it possible to support Obama if he enacts pragmatic and centrist policies that even conservative intellectuals support?