Friday, December 19, 2008

Unlocking Central Asia

As I wrote in a previous post, the "Great Game" is alive and well. Indeed, U.S. involvement is more extensive than I realized, going back to the early 1990's. Unfortunately few people understand the nature of U.S. and foreign involvement in Central Asia or the reasons behind it. In the most simplistic terms the question is how Central Asian energy supplies can get to world markets? Of crucial importance of course is which markets, which route, and under who's control?

Given the geographic proximity, historical, cultural and economic ties many former Soviet Republics see transport through Russia to the European market as the most viable export route for their energy supplies. But int he post Cold War world, the U.S. and Europe would rather ween these countries off their Russian dependency and diminish Russian influence in region by developing alternative transport routes. The ideal route to get Central Asian energy supplies to the world market and avoid Russian influence is to build pipelines South toward the Gulf and the Arabian sea. From their they can be transported to emerging Asia or to Europe through Suez.

Unfortunately the countries to the south are either U.S. geopolitical rivals (i.e. Iran) or unstable and susceptible to civil war (i.e. Afghanistan). The U.S. famously courted the Taliban in the 1990's in the hope that they could bring enough stability to the war torn country so that Unocal could build a pipeline from Turkmenistan through Western Afghanistan and on the Pakistan and the Arabian Sea. 15 years later the Southern route has yet be be realized and Russia largely maintains its monopoly on the transit of Caspian energy to Europe (minus a few routes that go through the Caucuses and Turkey).

Interested in establishing a bolt hole on the southern periphery of the continent China has built a deep water port in Pakistan's western Baluchistan province at Gwadar. The project suffers from a number of problems. The transport routes from the Caspian are not much safer or more fully developed than they were previously with Afghanistan still in bad shape. Trucking and pipeline construction remain risky business in the Southern and Western provinces of Afghanistan, largely because it requires going through Taliban held territory around Kandahar. Further complicating matter is ethnic and economic friction between Balchi tribes and the Punjabi dominate the central government in Islamabad. Gwadar is operational, but political and economic difficulties have prevented it from blossoming largely because investment in inland infrastructure has been lacking.

In contrast the transport route through Iran from the North eastern city of Mashad down to the port of Chabbar is much more effective (though restive, Iran has actual control over its territory, unlike Pakistan and Afghanistan). So long as the U.S. is determined to isolate Iran and so long as Afghanistan remains at war, the southern route will not be viable for accessing Central Asian resources and markets and the world will depend on Russia for pipelines to the Caspian. The Chinese, too, will likely find their ambitions at Gwadar frustrated by instability.

Rapprochement with Iran is becoming more imperative for more reasons, than ever before.

Petraeus's Cautious Optimism

These days I see more to be cautious about than optimistic. But I have to hand it to him at least Petraeus doesn't make triumphalist comments like Rumsfeld and Cheney. He knows all too well the hard slog ahead.

With elections in both Iraq and Afghanistan in 2009 and the promise of a fresh Taliban offensive in the spring, conditions could easily deteriorate in the first half of next year on both fronts. In Iraq, a small uptick in violence has gone largely unnoticed, but as I suggested in a previous post, the situation is ripe for AQ meddling. Attacks designed to stoke sectarian tension could prevent the U.S. from redeploying as quickly as is now planned. Although the government showed its teeth in 2008 in Basra and Sadr City, it is still fragile. If Parliament is divided over a shoe thrower, imagine what kind of political deadlock could follow potentially controversial elections.

Right now, Obama's presidency essentially hinges on continued progress in Iraq in order to redeploy to Afghanistan and pay for domestic spending. I suspect there will be substantial setbacks to the withdrawal plan in 2009 making Iraq another campaign promise that is more difficult to deliver on than anticipated. Fortunately (or unfortunately, deficits apparently no longer matter, so stay in Iraq as long as you need, its good for the economy!)

And you thought free trade was contentious here?

Many observers here in the U.S. are wondering where the new administration will stand on free trade. It is yet to be seen whether Obama will govern more base don his campaign positions or will form policy based on what his adviser say. Larry Summers is a strong supporter of free trade, but there is considerable disagreement within the party as the the benefits of free trade for the U.S. Pending free trade agreements with South Korea and Columbia are sure to be contentious, bringing out the farm and labor lobbies. Although the issue is likely to be contentious, (more so at a time when unemployment is rising), it could hardly compare to the raucous "debate" in the South Korean parliament. These guys are frickin nuts! Damn though, that would make 24 hr news way more interesting!

Bringing the Neighbors together

This meeting, and others like it are desperately important. Iranian participation is necessary and hopefully will come with U.S. rapprochement. India can play an important role in helping garner political and diplomatic support from neighboring states and bringing about cooperation between NATO and the neighbors. The Taliban and Islamabad have to know that they face a united front and that a Taliban return to power is not an option. This is a necessary precondition for them entering into a negotiated power-sharing agreement with the government.

Thursday, December 18, 2008

Open Seas (and Abundant Energy): The Real Engine of Globalization

Forget Thomas Friedman and his Lexus factory, his mag lev train and the information superhighway. Important though they are, information and communications technologies are not at the heart of the process we now call globalization. Rather globalization continues to rest, as it has in eras past, on open sea lanes (and abundant energy). These in turn depend on maritime security.

Globalization began when European explorers sailed off in the hope of finding a maritime route to Asia that would allow them to bypass the Ottoman Empire and reduce the cost of overland transport routes along the Silk Road. Originally seeking the spices of India, these explorers first discovered the Americas, where, instead of spices they found abundant gold and silver and cheap native labor (this was to prove fortuitous since the dirty half starved Europeans initially had little to offer to Asian merchants in exchange for spices. Andean gold and silver soon became the currency for European mercantilist power's Asia trade. So it seems the West has, historically speaking, often run a deficit with the Orient).

Just when they were losing the American colonies the British were consolidating their gains on the Subcontinent and thrashing the French, Dutch and Portuguese in the Asian trade. Over the next 80 odd years Great Britain was to establish hegemony on the subcontinent and make India the Jewel in the Queen's imperial crown. India, with its tea, wheat (from the Punjab), textiles, opium, jute, spices, and vast internal market played a central role in the previous era of globalization (the long 19th century from roughly 1787-1914). The transfer of wealth from India to Great Britain (as well as from other colonies) made Britain the "great" country it is today.

This previous era of globalization rested primarily on the British sea power and the liberal (i.e. "free trade") tradition of the Anglo merchants. The British Navy ruled the world's oceans, keeping them safe for imperial commerce from marauding pirates as well as other imperial aspirants seeking "preferential" ( i.e. monopolistic) terms of trade. As the crown Jewel, India was central to this global commercial network making British paramountcy in the Indian Ocean imperative. It also necessitated the control of strategic choke points and the establishment (as naval propulsion evolved from sail to steam) of coaling stations. Thus British control over the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden, the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Malacca was clearly essential for maintaining the security of European-Asian maritime trade.

Although the British Raj and the era of steam and sail of passed, the centrality of open sea lanes, maritime security--particularly the security of the Indian Ocean littoral--for maintaining globalization and East-West trade has not diminished. In at least one respect it has increased: Oil. An enormous volume of oil (indeed all Gulf oil) is transported across the Indian Ocean, and much of it passes through strategic choke points at the Gulf of Aden, Suez, and the Straits of Malacca. Naval security in the Indian Ocean did not diminish in importance with Indian independence and the age of oil. Not only are these sea lanes transport routes for international commerce in general but they are also essential to the secure transport of that special commodity (oil) that makes all other international commerce possible (since today's ships are themselves powered by it).

The decline of the British Empire, Indian independence and the onset of the Cold War all occurred roughly simultaneously. Each event affected Indian Ocean security as well as maritime security more generally. The U.S. and Soviet Union initially did not pay as much attention to naval competition in the Indian Ocean as they were more concerned with maritime security in the Atlantic and Pacific (where they each of access). Additionally, although the British Empire was a shadow of its former self after WWII, the process of decolonization in Asia took some time (they only gave up Hong Kong a decade ago) and the UK maintained a substantial naval capability, particularly in Asia. The Indian Ocean thus largely remained a "British lake" until the 1960's (the Suez crisis in 1956) was a defining moment.

The legacy of the Raj left the India largely without a navy. British global naval superiority did not necessitate the creation of an "Indian navy" and defense planning and resources were primarily focused on developing an Indian army that could defend the empire (as Indian soldiers did in WWI and WWII), protect against Russian aggression in the northwest (i.e. Afghanistan), and maintain internal order.


As British naval dominance in the Indian Ocean declined and with India unable to dedicate resources to developing a comparable naval capability, the superpowers rushed in to fill the "vacuum" in maritime security in the Indian Ocean (the U.S. acquired basing rights at Diego Garcia in 1971). The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 left only the U.S. with a global blue water capability. The invasions of Iraq (both) and Afghanistan make clear that U.S. naval dominance and power projection remains unmatched. But there may be a new naval race developing in the Indian Ocean littoral and the issue of maritime security is again becoming front page news.

Monday, December 15, 2008

The Asian Trinagle

I could talk for hours about the fascinating triangular relationship between India, China and Pakistan, but instead I want to leave a few links to recent articles and blogs talking about this "Asian Triangle." The World Politics Review published three insightful articles on the the matter from each countries' perspective. Joshua Foust who contributes to an excellent blog (Registan.net) on Central Asia and Afghanistan notes the WPR articles here and also pointed to several recent article on the subject of China pressuring Pakistan to ban Jamaat ud-Dawa. Myra MacDonald also offered this thought provoking post on her blog for Reuters. Both of them reference this anonymous editorial from the Daily Times claiming that it was Chinese rather than U.S pressure that convinced Pakistan to take action against JD and LeT. Lastly, the always timely column of Sudha Ramachandran (Asia Times) also focused on the recent UNSC sanction of Dawa.

Of course, China allegedly insisted the General Hamid Gul be removed from the UNSC resolution imposing sanctions. And though it is tempting for me to make a joke here about the insightfulness of "Team America" I will restrain myself...

My view of all this is that China chose not to exercise its UNSC veto this time around for a variety of reasons. First, the political and diplomatic pressure on Pakistan right now is intense. To shield Pakistan in this context would result in international condemnation and be used as evidence of China's unreadiness to become a responsible member of the international community. Second, China has legitimate concerns about Uighur terrorism and does not want to see terrorist flourish in Pakistan. Third, it would have damaged improving relations with New Delhi. Fourth, it would have increased the probability of punitive strikes by Delhi. Not only would a major war on the subcontinent be bad for the world economy right now, but China could be pulled into such a conflict. That takes us to a fifth reason. China and Pakistan are close, close allies. China has shared nuclear and missile technology with Pakistan and been Islamabad's most trusted patron. The two countries share a common enemy in India and have each used the other to threaten India (with a second front) during their respective conflicts. While China is likely to keep Pakistan as a "hedge" against India (and any U.S.-India alliance), Beijing is not interested in raising tensions with Delhi right now. Like Pakistan's civilian government and more pragmatic military officials, the Chinese are not interested in being dragged into a conflict with India by a bunch of religious nuts who think that Islam is again going to conquer India.

Undoubtedly the current conversation between China and Pakistan goes something like this:

Pakistan: We did not sponsor this attack. It is true it was planned on our territory and some 'rouge' elements in the military-intelligence services provided ideological and logistical support. But we are not interested in war with India right now. We are economically broken, politically vulnerable and our military is stretched thin. But how can we get rid of the Kashmiri groups? We need them. We have to maintain an asymmetrical capability to compete with India. They [India] are economically much stronger, have conventional superiority, and an emerging alliance with the United States which will undoubtedly allow them to produce more nuclear weapons--maybe even develop a first strike capability? Surely you recognize this also. We need you, and you need us. We can continue to use the asymmetrical threat of terrorism to slow India's growth and ensure that you maintain your lead in the race for Asia. You need us to be able to open a 'second front' if you became involved in a war with India. Finally, we can drive a wedge between Delhi and Washington and keep America tied down in Afghanistan thus affording you more time to develop without the U.S. trying to slow you or encircle you.

China: This is all true. But for now, you have to weigh the benefits of taking what are essentially symbolic actions and the cost of open hostility. For now, it is best to ban the LeT and JD and place some leaders under house arrest. They can always change their name or go "underground" as they have before. You can always release them from prison when the climate is more favorable (as you have before). The world is too fragile for a major war right now. The global economy is bad. We are facing the slowest growth we have seen in decades. 2009 could see mass instability in China. The last thing the world needs right now is a massive war between yourself and India. The economic consequences could be dire. And we are not in a position to come to your aid. We cannot be relied on to open a "second front" if need be. Such an action would also almost certainly require a U.S. response. We cannot be pulled into a war. Furthermore, if we play ball with Washington now, it will be harder for them to call us out when we push for further cooperation later. When the climate is more favourable we can again talk about nuclear cooperation so that you do not have to fear India's nuclear capability. Play along with their demands for now. Give up as little as is possible now, but give up what is necessary in order to avoid open hostility--at least until the constellation of forces is more in our favor.