Monday, December 15, 2008

The Asian Trinagle

I could talk for hours about the fascinating triangular relationship between India, China and Pakistan, but instead I want to leave a few links to recent articles and blogs talking about this "Asian Triangle." The World Politics Review published three insightful articles on the the matter from each countries' perspective. Joshua Foust who contributes to an excellent blog (Registan.net) on Central Asia and Afghanistan notes the WPR articles here and also pointed to several recent article on the subject of China pressuring Pakistan to ban Jamaat ud-Dawa. Myra MacDonald also offered this thought provoking post on her blog for Reuters. Both of them reference this anonymous editorial from the Daily Times claiming that it was Chinese rather than U.S pressure that convinced Pakistan to take action against JD and LeT. Lastly, the always timely column of Sudha Ramachandran (Asia Times) also focused on the recent UNSC sanction of Dawa.

Of course, China allegedly insisted the General Hamid Gul be removed from the UNSC resolution imposing sanctions. And though it is tempting for me to make a joke here about the insightfulness of "Team America" I will restrain myself...

My view of all this is that China chose not to exercise its UNSC veto this time around for a variety of reasons. First, the political and diplomatic pressure on Pakistan right now is intense. To shield Pakistan in this context would result in international condemnation and be used as evidence of China's unreadiness to become a responsible member of the international community. Second, China has legitimate concerns about Uighur terrorism and does not want to see terrorist flourish in Pakistan. Third, it would have damaged improving relations with New Delhi. Fourth, it would have increased the probability of punitive strikes by Delhi. Not only would a major war on the subcontinent be bad for the world economy right now, but China could be pulled into such a conflict. That takes us to a fifth reason. China and Pakistan are close, close allies. China has shared nuclear and missile technology with Pakistan and been Islamabad's most trusted patron. The two countries share a common enemy in India and have each used the other to threaten India (with a second front) during their respective conflicts. While China is likely to keep Pakistan as a "hedge" against India (and any U.S.-India alliance), Beijing is not interested in raising tensions with Delhi right now. Like Pakistan's civilian government and more pragmatic military officials, the Chinese are not interested in being dragged into a conflict with India by a bunch of religious nuts who think that Islam is again going to conquer India.

Undoubtedly the current conversation between China and Pakistan goes something like this:

Pakistan: We did not sponsor this attack. It is true it was planned on our territory and some 'rouge' elements in the military-intelligence services provided ideological and logistical support. But we are not interested in war with India right now. We are economically broken, politically vulnerable and our military is stretched thin. But how can we get rid of the Kashmiri groups? We need them. We have to maintain an asymmetrical capability to compete with India. They [India] are economically much stronger, have conventional superiority, and an emerging alliance with the United States which will undoubtedly allow them to produce more nuclear weapons--maybe even develop a first strike capability? Surely you recognize this also. We need you, and you need us. We can continue to use the asymmetrical threat of terrorism to slow India's growth and ensure that you maintain your lead in the race for Asia. You need us to be able to open a 'second front' if you became involved in a war with India. Finally, we can drive a wedge between Delhi and Washington and keep America tied down in Afghanistan thus affording you more time to develop without the U.S. trying to slow you or encircle you.

China: This is all true. But for now, you have to weigh the benefits of taking what are essentially symbolic actions and the cost of open hostility. For now, it is best to ban the LeT and JD and place some leaders under house arrest. They can always change their name or go "underground" as they have before. You can always release them from prison when the climate is more favorable (as you have before). The world is too fragile for a major war right now. The global economy is bad. We are facing the slowest growth we have seen in decades. 2009 could see mass instability in China. The last thing the world needs right now is a massive war between yourself and India. The economic consequences could be dire. And we are not in a position to come to your aid. We cannot be relied on to open a "second front" if need be. Such an action would also almost certainly require a U.S. response. We cannot be pulled into a war. Furthermore, if we play ball with Washington now, it will be harder for them to call us out when we push for further cooperation later. When the climate is more favourable we can again talk about nuclear cooperation so that you do not have to fear India's nuclear capability. Play along with their demands for now. Give up as little as is possible now, but give up what is necessary in order to avoid open hostility--at least until the constellation of forces is more in our favor.

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