Thursday, December 18, 2008

Open Seas (and Abundant Energy): The Real Engine of Globalization

Forget Thomas Friedman and his Lexus factory, his mag lev train and the information superhighway. Important though they are, information and communications technologies are not at the heart of the process we now call globalization. Rather globalization continues to rest, as it has in eras past, on open sea lanes (and abundant energy). These in turn depend on maritime security.

Globalization began when European explorers sailed off in the hope of finding a maritime route to Asia that would allow them to bypass the Ottoman Empire and reduce the cost of overland transport routes along the Silk Road. Originally seeking the spices of India, these explorers first discovered the Americas, where, instead of spices they found abundant gold and silver and cheap native labor (this was to prove fortuitous since the dirty half starved Europeans initially had little to offer to Asian merchants in exchange for spices. Andean gold and silver soon became the currency for European mercantilist power's Asia trade. So it seems the West has, historically speaking, often run a deficit with the Orient).

Just when they were losing the American colonies the British were consolidating their gains on the Subcontinent and thrashing the French, Dutch and Portuguese in the Asian trade. Over the next 80 odd years Great Britain was to establish hegemony on the subcontinent and make India the Jewel in the Queen's imperial crown. India, with its tea, wheat (from the Punjab), textiles, opium, jute, spices, and vast internal market played a central role in the previous era of globalization (the long 19th century from roughly 1787-1914). The transfer of wealth from India to Great Britain (as well as from other colonies) made Britain the "great" country it is today.

This previous era of globalization rested primarily on the British sea power and the liberal (i.e. "free trade") tradition of the Anglo merchants. The British Navy ruled the world's oceans, keeping them safe for imperial commerce from marauding pirates as well as other imperial aspirants seeking "preferential" ( i.e. monopolistic) terms of trade. As the crown Jewel, India was central to this global commercial network making British paramountcy in the Indian Ocean imperative. It also necessitated the control of strategic choke points and the establishment (as naval propulsion evolved from sail to steam) of coaling stations. Thus British control over the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden, the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Malacca was clearly essential for maintaining the security of European-Asian maritime trade.

Although the British Raj and the era of steam and sail of passed, the centrality of open sea lanes, maritime security--particularly the security of the Indian Ocean littoral--for maintaining globalization and East-West trade has not diminished. In at least one respect it has increased: Oil. An enormous volume of oil (indeed all Gulf oil) is transported across the Indian Ocean, and much of it passes through strategic choke points at the Gulf of Aden, Suez, and the Straits of Malacca. Naval security in the Indian Ocean did not diminish in importance with Indian independence and the age of oil. Not only are these sea lanes transport routes for international commerce in general but they are also essential to the secure transport of that special commodity (oil) that makes all other international commerce possible (since today's ships are themselves powered by it).

The decline of the British Empire, Indian independence and the onset of the Cold War all occurred roughly simultaneously. Each event affected Indian Ocean security as well as maritime security more generally. The U.S. and Soviet Union initially did not pay as much attention to naval competition in the Indian Ocean as they were more concerned with maritime security in the Atlantic and Pacific (where they each of access). Additionally, although the British Empire was a shadow of its former self after WWII, the process of decolonization in Asia took some time (they only gave up Hong Kong a decade ago) and the UK maintained a substantial naval capability, particularly in Asia. The Indian Ocean thus largely remained a "British lake" until the 1960's (the Suez crisis in 1956) was a defining moment.

The legacy of the Raj left the India largely without a navy. British global naval superiority did not necessitate the creation of an "Indian navy" and defense planning and resources were primarily focused on developing an Indian army that could defend the empire (as Indian soldiers did in WWI and WWII), protect against Russian aggression in the northwest (i.e. Afghanistan), and maintain internal order.


As British naval dominance in the Indian Ocean declined and with India unable to dedicate resources to developing a comparable naval capability, the superpowers rushed in to fill the "vacuum" in maritime security in the Indian Ocean (the U.S. acquired basing rights at Diego Garcia in 1971). The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 left only the U.S. with a global blue water capability. The invasions of Iraq (both) and Afghanistan make clear that U.S. naval dominance and power projection remains unmatched. But there may be a new naval race developing in the Indian Ocean littoral and the issue of maritime security is again becoming front page news.

No comments:

Post a Comment