Friday, December 19, 2008

Unlocking Central Asia

As I wrote in a previous post, the "Great Game" is alive and well. Indeed, U.S. involvement is more extensive than I realized, going back to the early 1990's. Unfortunately few people understand the nature of U.S. and foreign involvement in Central Asia or the reasons behind it. In the most simplistic terms the question is how Central Asian energy supplies can get to world markets? Of crucial importance of course is which markets, which route, and under who's control?

Given the geographic proximity, historical, cultural and economic ties many former Soviet Republics see transport through Russia to the European market as the most viable export route for their energy supplies. But int he post Cold War world, the U.S. and Europe would rather ween these countries off their Russian dependency and diminish Russian influence in region by developing alternative transport routes. The ideal route to get Central Asian energy supplies to the world market and avoid Russian influence is to build pipelines South toward the Gulf and the Arabian sea. From their they can be transported to emerging Asia or to Europe through Suez.

Unfortunately the countries to the south are either U.S. geopolitical rivals (i.e. Iran) or unstable and susceptible to civil war (i.e. Afghanistan). The U.S. famously courted the Taliban in the 1990's in the hope that they could bring enough stability to the war torn country so that Unocal could build a pipeline from Turkmenistan through Western Afghanistan and on the Pakistan and the Arabian Sea. 15 years later the Southern route has yet be be realized and Russia largely maintains its monopoly on the transit of Caspian energy to Europe (minus a few routes that go through the Caucuses and Turkey).

Interested in establishing a bolt hole on the southern periphery of the continent China has built a deep water port in Pakistan's western Baluchistan province at Gwadar. The project suffers from a number of problems. The transport routes from the Caspian are not much safer or more fully developed than they were previously with Afghanistan still in bad shape. Trucking and pipeline construction remain risky business in the Southern and Western provinces of Afghanistan, largely because it requires going through Taliban held territory around Kandahar. Further complicating matter is ethnic and economic friction between Balchi tribes and the Punjabi dominate the central government in Islamabad. Gwadar is operational, but political and economic difficulties have prevented it from blossoming largely because investment in inland infrastructure has been lacking.

In contrast the transport route through Iran from the North eastern city of Mashad down to the port of Chabbar is much more effective (though restive, Iran has actual control over its territory, unlike Pakistan and Afghanistan). So long as the U.S. is determined to isolate Iran and so long as Afghanistan remains at war, the southern route will not be viable for accessing Central Asian resources and markets and the world will depend on Russia for pipelines to the Caspian. The Chinese, too, will likely find their ambitions at Gwadar frustrated by instability.

Rapprochement with Iran is becoming more imperative for more reasons, than ever before.

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